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Abstract
Brain activity determines which relations between objects in the environment are 
perceived as differences and similarities in colour, smell, sound, etc. According to 
selectionism, brain activity does not create those relations; it only selects which of 
them are perceptually available to the subject on a given occasion. In effect, selec-
tionism entails that perceptual experience is diaphanous, i.e. that sameness and dif-
ference in the phenomenal character of experience is exhausted by sameness and dif-
ference in the perceived items. It has been argued that diaphaneity is undermined by 
phenomenological considerations and empirical evidence. This paper considers five 
prominent arguments of this sort and shows that none of them succeeds.
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1 Introduction
The perceived differences and similarities in sensory qualities such as colour or 
smell are determined by neural activity in our brains. According to the idea known 
as ‘selectionism’, brain activity does not create those relations; it just selects which 
of them are perceptually available to the subject on a given occasion. A straight-
forward consequence of selectionism is the diaphaneity thesis1, according to which 
sameness and difference in the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is 
exhausted by sameness and difference in the perceived items. Many philosophers 
believe that this consequence renders selectionism unacceptable. Some of them 
argue that diaphaneity is undermined by phenomenological considerations, others 
find it incompatible with empirical evidence.
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1 This is not to say that all formulations of selectionism entail that experience is fully diaphanous. Differ-
ent versions of selectionism vary in scope, and the scope of diaphaneity depends on the scope of selec-
tionism. I say more about this in Sects. 2 and 3.
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This paper considers five prominent objections of this sort and shows that 
none of them reaches the target. More specifically, I argue that phenomenological 
observations and empirical findings on which these objections are based can be 
plausibly explained in terms of selectionism and diaphaneity. While both claims 
could still be contested on some other grounds, the availability of such alterna-
tive explanations shows that they are not nearly as easy to refute as they are often 
taken to be.
To be clear, my aim is not to show that in each case an explanation in terms of 
selectionism and diaphaneity is the only way to go. To make my point, I only need 
to show that such an explanation is available and has some substantial motivation.
My defence of diaphaneity rests on three fundamental assumptions: (i) there is 
a clear distinction between perception and cognition; (ii) a single object can have 
both physical and non-physical properties; (iii) the phenomenal character of percep-
tual experience does not depend on consciousness for its existence. While the oppo-
nent of diaphaneity might find these claims exceptionable, they cannot be dismissed 
without argument. Unless they are proven false, diaphaneity is immune to the objec-
tions discussed in this paper, and selectionism remains a viable option.
Section  2 spells out selectionism using colour perception as an example. Sec-
tion 3 introduces diaphaneity as a corollary of selectionism. Sections 4 and 5 defend 
diaphaneity from phenomenological objections concerning the boundaries of visual 
experience and blurry vision. Sections 6, 7 and 8 defend diaphaneity from empiri-
cal objections concerning attentional variation, the correlation between perceptual 
phenomenal character and various physical properties, and unconscious perception. 
Section 9 argues that selectionism is preferable over non-selectionist attempts to pre-
serve the objectivity of perceptual phenomenal character. Section 10 concludes.
2  Selectionism
In everyday life, we tend to treat colours as objective because colour perception 
affords us knowledge about the environment. Perceiving changes in colour informs 
us that it is safe to cross the street, that the food is cooked, and so on. However, 
colour objectivism is challenged by colour variation (see e.g. Burnyeat 1979; Block 
1999; Mizrahi 2006; Kalderon 2007; Allen 2016). There are three kinds of such 
variation: (i) intersubjective (the same object in the same conditions can appear to 
have some colour to one subject and a different colour to another subject); (ii) intra-
subjective (the same object can appear to have different colours to the same subject 
in different conditions); (iii) inter-species (the same object in the same conditions 
can appear to have different colours to members of different species). The apparent 
clash between the pre-theoretical colour objectivism and colour variation leads to 
the following paradox (Kalderon 2007, 567):
(A) x appears F and x appears G.
(B) The F-appearance and the G-appearance are both veridical.
(C) Nothing is both F and G.
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While each of these claims seems plausible when considered separately from the 
remaining two, together they are inconsistent. Something has got to give.
One possible resolution to the paradox is selectionism, which consists in accept-
ing A–B and rejecting C. The rejection of C entails colour pluralism, i.e. the idea 
that a single object has multiple colours all over at the same time. This allows the 
selectionist to argue that colour variation occurs because different colours of a single 
object are perceptually available in different conditions, and to different subjects. 
Whenever two subjects perceive different colours while seeing the same object in 
the same circumstances, this is because their respective visual systems select (e.g. 
render visually available) different colours of that object (Kalderon 2007, 593; cf. 
Allen 2016, 66–73). In effect, selectionism accommodates colour variation while 
preserving colour objectivism.
Selectionism can be unpacked in different ways, and thereby admits of being 
incorporated into different theoretical frameworks. For instance, various forms of 
selectionism differ with respect to what is selected (i.e. what properties we perceive). 
When it comes to colour perception, it can be colours qua sensory qualities (Allen 
2016; Mizrahi 2006), sensible aspects of colours (Kalderon 2008), shades deter-
mined by colours and illumination (Fish 2009), or objective appearances determined 
by intrinsic properties of objects and environmental conditions (Genone 2014). The 
issue of what is selected complicates when one tries to extend selectionism to prop-
erties other than colours, and to sense modalities other than vision. In what follows, 
I defend a version of selectionism according to which the perceptual system selects 
instances of proper sensibles and aspects of instances of common sensibles2.
Relatedly, various versions of selectionism differ in scope (see also Section 2). 
For example, Allen (Allen 2016, 66–67) claims that extending selectionism to all 
cases of intra- and inter-subjective variation is neither mandatory nor preferable, 
even after one applies it to inter-species variation. It is not mandatory because inter-
subjective variation is much smaller than sometimes suggested, and when it comes 
to perception of relatively coarse-grained colours (e.g. green, red, blue, yellow), 
experiences of normal perceivers converge sufficiently to justify the mind-inde-
pendence of colours (Allen 2016, 61). It is not preferable in that it makes it hard to 
explain constancy in colour perception.
Yet there is an alternative. Mizrahi (2006), who endorses selectionism with 
respect to all kinds of perceptual variation, accounts for colour constancy by distin-
guishing two different concepts of colour:  colour1 and  colour2. Selectionism is pri-
marily a claim about  colours1. Those are the colours we see. By contrast, an object 
can have only one  colour2 at any given time.  Colours2 are not experienced directly 
but through a change in  colour1. If a change in illumination reveals a difference in 
 colour1 between two objects, those objects do not have the same  colour2. This ena-
bles one to endorse selectionism about all kinds of colour variation while still being 
able to account for colour constancy. That each object has multiple  colours1 does not 
2 Common sensibles (a.k.a. primary qualities) are qualities perceivable by more than one sense (e.g. 
size, shape, solidity, number, rest, motion). Proper sensibles (a.k.a. secondary qualities) are qualities per-
ceivable by a single sense (e.g. colour, smell, taste, sound, warmth or cold, and so on).
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entail that each object has those colours in the same way. Mizrahi (2006, 296) illus-
trates this by comparing a ripe banana in red light to a ripe tomato in daylight. They 
have the same  colour1 but differ with respect to  colour2.
Regarding the metaphysics of colour, selectionism entails colour realism (the 
view that colours are real) and consorts with colour objectivism (the view that col-
ours are environmental features that exist independently of being perceived)3. Selec-
tionism is also neutral regarding the reducibility of colours to physical properties. It 
is compatible with both colour reductionism, which identifies colours with reflec-
tances over one or many wavelength intervals (Mizrahi 2006), and colour primitiv-
ism, which construes them as simple, sui generis properties, not identical to physical 
properties (Kalderon 2007, 2011b; Allen 2016).
Selectionism partially explains the nature of the phenomenal character of per-
ceptual experience, which is a set of qualities that determine what it is like to have 
a perceptual experience (Coates and Coleman 2015, 2). Primitivist selectionism is 
often combined with the relational theory of perception, according to which the phe-
nomenal character of perceptual experience is at least partially constituted by the 
mind-independent object (see e.g. Brewer 2011; Campbell 2002; Martin 2004). This 
leads to the view that the perceptual system can select different property instances 
the perceived object instantiates on different occasions.
That said, selectionism is not incompatible with relationalism’s main rival, i.e. 
intentionalism about perception, which construes perception as a mental representa-
tion that represents the world as being a certain way (see e.g. Siegel 2010). On that 
view, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is not constituted by the 
mind-independent object because it is consistent with inexistence of the perceived 
object. Intentionalist selectionism claims that the perceptual system selects which 
features of the environment are perceptually represented on a given occasion.
Nevertheless, below I defend only the primitivist-relationalist version of selec-
tionism because (i) reductionist selectionism is undermined by empirical evidence 
(see Sect.  7), and (ii) my replies to phenomenological objections to selectionism 
partially rest on scepticism concerning the idea that perceptual experience has inten-
tional content (see Sect. 5).
3  Diaphaneity
If the perceptual system merely selects which parts of the environment constitute 
perceptual phenomenal character, it does not add anything non-environmental to 
that character. It follows that the selected (and thereby perceived) items are the only 
constituents of perceptual phenomenal character. Unless qualified in some way (e.g. 
restricted in scope to a single sensible quality or a single sense modality), selection-
ism entails that:




(Diaphaneity) Sameness and difference in phenomenal character between any 
two perceptual experiences is entirely constituted by sameness and difference 
in the perceived items (cf. Martin 1998, 175).
It is the commitment to diaphaneity that the critics of various forms of selection-
ism find incompatible with phenomenological observations and empirical evidence. 
Before I consider their arguments, I need to make some clarifications.
First, the scope of diaphaneity depends on the scope of selectionism. For exam-
ple, if one endorses selectionism only with respect to inter-species variation in col-
our perception, one is only committed to diaphaneity as far as that variation is con-
cerned. On this view, differences in colour experience between members of different 
species are explained by suggesting that they perceive different colours, whereas 
other differences in colour experience can be explained by suggesting that the same 
colour is perceived in two different ways (whatever that might mean). This shows 
that there are intermediate options between full diaphaneity and unreserved denial 
of diaphaneity.
Although selectionism is typically endorsed in a restricted form (i.e. applied 
locally to a certain type of phenomenal difference), there are at least two theories 
of perception that are arguably committed to unrestricted selectionism (and thereby 
also to full diaphaneity). The first is Travis’ relationalism (Travis 2004), according 
to which the senses merely bring things in view for the subject, without specifying 
how things are. The second is Pure Relationalism identified (but not endorsed) by 
Stoneham (2008), according to which perception occurs in the environment, not in 
the subject. In this connection, the reasons to endorse selectionism and diaphaneity 
ensue from (or simply overlap with) the motivations behind the forms of relational-
ism that are committed to selectionism and diaphaneity4.
This paper is neutral about the question of whether totally unrestricted selec-
tionism is tenable. Its goal is limited to showing that none of the arguments against 
diaphaneity considered below suffices to justify any such restriction, which lends 
some support to full diaphaneity. All that being said, for simplicity, I will use the 
terms ‘selectionism’ and ‘diaphaneity’ in the unrestricted sense.
Second, the history of diaphaneity, discussed at length by many philosophers 
(see e.g. Martin 1998, 2015; Stoljar 2004; Stoneham 2008; Van Cleve 2015; French 
2018), is usually traced back to G.E. Moore (1922). In this paper, however, I am pri-
marily interested in diaphaneity as a corollary of the primitivist-relationalist version 
of selectionism. Thus understood, diaphaneity entails that:
Difference Principle: Necessarily, if two experiences differ in phenomenal 
character, then they differ in character-constituting presented elements.
4 It might be objected that it is possible to maintain even the most austere forms of relationalism without 
the commitment to selectionism and diaphaneity by suggesting that a single object can be perceived in 




Sameness Principle: Necessarily, if two experiences are alike in phenom-
enal character, then they are alike in character-constituting presented elements. 
(French and Phillips 2020, 4; cf. French 2018, 152)
Third, diaphaneity is not equivalent to transparency. Consider two distinctions: 
metaphysical vs. phenomenological transparency (Gow 2016), and strong vs. weak 
transparency (Kind 2003). In the sense relevant to this paper, diaphaneity entails (but 
is not entailed by) metaphysical transparency (i.e. the claim that in having a perceptual 
experience one is only aware of the perceived items), and supports (but does not entail) 
phenomenological transparency (i.e. the claim that introspection of perceptual experi-
ence does not seem to reveal anything over and above the perceived items). On the 
other hand, diaphaneity understood as a corollary of primitivist-relationalist formula-
tion of selectionism is antithetical to both strong transparency (i.e. the claim that it is 
impossible to attend directly to one’s experience) and weak transparency (i.e. the claim 
that attending directly to one’s experience is possible albeit difficult). This is because 
relationalism entails that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is liter-
ally constituted by the perceived items, which means that attending to the perceived 
items amounts to attending to the experience itself. On this view, diaphaneity does not 
entail that one can only become aware of one’s experience indirectly (i.e. in virtue of 
being aware of the perceived items), but it does entail that one can only become aware 
of one’s experience’s structural features indirectly (i.e. in virtue of being aware of the 
perceived items). I say more about this in Sect. 4.
Fourth, while diaphaneity entails that sameness and difference in phenomenal char-
acter is solely determined by sameness and difference in perceived items, it does not 
follow that the perceptual system does not participate in shaping the phenomenal char-
acter at all. To have that consequence, diaphaneity would have to be combined with 
negation of selectionism. According to selectionism, every perception reveals some 
aspects of the environment rather than another. Perceptual system determines which of 
those aspects are revealed on a given occasion. This is a substantial contribution to phe-
nomenal character. That said, the conjunction of diaphaneity and selectionism entails 
that perceptual phenomenal character does not involve any mind-dependent phenom-
enal qualities, and this is what the critics deny.
Fifth, selectionism is a thesis about what it is like to perceive something, not about 
what it is like to be a subject that perceives something. What-it-is-like-ness in the lat-
ter sense is arguably determined by the totality of one’s conscious mental states at the 
time of perceiving, of which what it is like to perceive something is only a part. For this 
reason, diaphaneity understood as a corollary of selectionism is not undermined by the 
fact that what it is like to be S who perceives O is partially determined by, say, the phe-
nomenal character of an emotion S consciously feels at the time of perceiving O.
4  The Boundaries of Visual Experience
Drawing on the works of Martin (1992), Richardson (2010) and Soteriou (2013), 
French (2018, 162–71) set forth a phenomenological argument against diaphane-
ity. Because French aims to persuade the relationalist to abandon diaphaneity, the 
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argument assumes, in accordance with the relational view, that perceptual phe-
nomenal character is at least partially constituted by aspects of the environment.
The argument starts with the observation that the phenomenal character of 
conscious visual experience involves spatial limitations. To explain why this is 
so, it is not enough to say that one can only see a limited amount of the visible 
aspects of the environment at a time. For the boundaries in question are not set by 
the visible aspects of the environment, nor are they set by the space these aspects 
occupy. They are set by the sensory limitations of the perceiver.
Here French appeals to the fact that visual experience has a cone-shaped visual 
field, the apex of which is where the eyes are. According to Richardson’s inter-
pretation of Martin’s work, the visual field is a structural feature shared by all 
visual experiences. It is ‘structural’ in the sense of being common to all visual 
experiences, irrespective of what is experienced. As such, it is non-environmental 
(i.e. distinct form the perceived items), but nonetheless intrinsic to the phenom-
enal character of visual experience because it cannot be detached from it. What 
is more, the visual field is manifest in the phenomenology of visual experience, 
and evinces itself in the ‘feeling’ or ‘seeming’ (i) that there is always more to be 
seen than one actually sees at a given moment, and (ii) that, whether one is seeing 
some object or just an empty space, there is a region of space within which one 
can see something (Richardson 2010, 234, 238–39).
Now, since the limitation aspect of visual phenomenal character is constituted 
by the subject’s sensory limitations (i.e. the visual field), it is not constituted by 
the perceived items. It follows that visual phenomenal character is not entirely 
constituted by the seen items, i.e. that diaphaneity is false (at least with respect to 
visual experience).
For this argument to work, the limitation aspect must constitute the phenom-
enal character in the same sense in which the environmental aspects constitute 
it. That is to say, the boundaries of the visual field must be phenomenologically 
manifest in visual phenomenology in the same way in which the seen items are. 
But they are not. While it is true that the boundaries are set by the subject and not 
by the environment, they are not seen in the same sense in which the environment 
is seen. In fact, they are not seen at all.
The boundaries of visual experience are supposed to be different from the seen 
items. Consequently, the awareness of the former is different from the awareness 
of the latter. If one could become aware of the boundaries in the same way in 
which one is aware of the items, the boundaries would reduce to the items. Since 
they are not so reducible, they are not perceived. They are just a feature of visual 
experience the perceiver discovers by way of comparing their current visual expe-
rience with the ones they had before.
On the relational view, visual awareness is an awareness of visible aspects of 
the environment. The latter constitute the phenomenal character of perceptual 
experience in the literal sense (i.e. they are proper parts of it). Since visual aware-
ness is not an awareness of sensory limitations of visual experience, such limita-
tions are not a proper part of the phenomenal character of seeing.
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This is not to deny that visual experience has a field. The point is only that 
the visual field does not contribute to visual phenomenology in the same way in 
which the seen items do. It may be constitutive of the phenomenal character in 
some sense, but certainly not in the sense in which the seen items constitute it. 
Hence French’s argument fails due to the fallacy of equivocation.
To illustrate, imagine a possible world in which there is just one subject, call 
him Bud, who is about to open his eyes for the first time, and all there is to see 
is a bunch of red dots scattered across space. How many visual experiences does 
Bud have to undergo to find out about the environmental aspects and the limita-
tion aspects of his visual experience? When it comes to environmental aspects, 
one experience should suffice. To find out that there is a red dot before him, it is 
enough if Bud looks just once. For all Bud knows after taking that single look, 
what he has seen could be all there is to see, in which case his visual experience 
would be spatially unlimited in this world. Hence it does not ‘seem’ to him at this 
point that there is more to be seen there. To find out about the limitation aspect of 
his visual experience, Bud has to undergo at least two experiences, and then com-
pare them to each other. Only after looking for the second time (this time from a 
different perspective), can he learn that there was more to be seen when he was 
looking for the first time. Only then can he learn that he cannot see everything 
there is to see by looking just once, and thereby discover the limitation of his 
visual experience.
This thought experiment shows that the limitation aspect is not manifest in 
experience in the same way as the environmental aspects are. To find out about 
the dot, it suffices if Bud looks at it just once. To find out about his own visual 
limitations, he has to look at least twice, each time from a different perspective 
(i.e. look in two different directions, or with one eye closed at first, and then with 
both eyes open), learn that his first experience was not an experience of all there 
is to see, and then infer from all this that his vision is spatially limited. Visual 
boundaries are not visually manifest to Bud in the same way in which the dots 
are. They are perceptually available to him only indirectly. He can only become 
aware of them by comparing what he sees on various occasions.
According to Stoljar (2004, 372–73), assuming that perceptual model of intro-
spection is false, being aware of intrinsic features of one’s own experience in vir-
tue of being aware of the perceived items still counts as an instance of direct 
awareness. For it does not consist in becoming aware of a fact in virtue of becom-
ing aware of another fact. Instead, one becomes aware of facts about the intrinsic 
features of one’s perceptual experience in the same way in which one becomes 
aware of facts about the perceived items, namely in virtue of being aware of the 
perceived items. Awareness of the intrinsic features of perceptual experience 
would count as indirect if it was based on some further facts, but there are no 
such further facts. Stoljar (2004, 384) concludes that
there is no way to defend the inference from the claim that I apprehend the 
intrinsic features of my experience by apprehending objects and properties 




But one cannot become aware of the structural (or intrinsic) features of one’s per-
ceptual experience solely by becoming aware of the perceived items. One has to first 
become aware of facts about the ways in which the phenomenal characters of one’s 
different experiences compare to each other.
The phenomenal character of seeing is constituted by what is seen. Since the lim-
itation aspect of seeing is not seen, it does not constitute the phenomenal character, 
at least not in the relevant sense. Its role in shaping the phenomenal character is 
indirect, in that it determines which visible aspects of the environment constitute the 
phenomenal character. In this connection, the fact that visual experience has spa-
tial boundaries is not only harmless to diaphaneity, but also supportive of selection-
ism. For the observation that each perceptual episode affords the perceiver a limited 
perspective on the world reinforces the claim that the architecture of the perceptual 
system selects which parts of the world are perceptually available to the perceiver 
on a given occasion (i.e. which parts of the world constitute perceptual phenomenal 
character on a given occasion).
If this is correct, the selectionist can and should turn the table on French by 
responding that he has failed to acknowledge the difference between (i) the way 
the visual field constitutes the phenomenal character and (ii) the way the perceived 
items constitute the phenomenal character.
5  Blurry Vision
The second phenomenological objection to diaphaneity concerns blurry vision. 
According to French (2014, 409–13), blurriness never occurs in and of itself; it 
always attaches itself to the presentational aspect of experience. One cannot just 
experience blurrily because blurriness is always a way of experiencing something, 
i.e. a modification of a presentation. On this view, blur is a phenomenologically 
manifest feature of perceptual phenomenal character that is not constituted by the 
perceived items, which is incompatible with diaphaneity. French (2014, 412) writes:
the blurriness involved in seeing blurrily does not even seem to be a presenta-
tional aspect of experience, yet the seeming involvement of objects, colours, 
and shapes in experience does seem to be presentational.
This point is not decisive because these seemings are better understood as cog-
nitive states accompanying visual experiences rather than aspects of visual phe-
nomenology (Gow 2019). Still, is it possible to explain blur without violating 
diaphaneity?
When I look at my glasses without having them on, it is not unreasonable to 
say that it is their objective blurry look that constitutes my current visual experi-
ence. For one thing, being familiar with this look helps me find the glasses when 
they are lost. For another, the blurry look of my glasses is not private because it is 
perceptually available to anyone who has the same vision defect as I do (or wears 
glasses inducing that defect). This suggests that the blurry look of my glasses is just 
as objective as their sharp look. On this view, both these looks are equally genuine 
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visible aspects of the shape of my glasses. They are genuine in the sense that none of 
them is illusory or distorted.
Smith (2008, 203) has objected that this approach is phenomenologically inac-
curate because it collapses the distinction between seeing blurrily and seeing a fuzzy 
object. That an object looks fuzzy to one does not necessarily mean that one sees 
it blurrily; it might just be a fuzzy object seen sharply. Conversely, an object might 
be seen blurrily despite being sharp. Furthermore, seeing blurrily usually does not 
dispose people to think that the object is fuzzy. Instead, people tend to withhold 
judgment regarding the shape of the object. If blurry vision revealed some otherwise 
unavailable properties of the object, it would make one prone to judge that the object 
is fuzzy, but this is not the case.
It is true that fuzziness and blurriness are two different properties. The conditions 
necessary for an object to look fuzzy differ from the conditions necessary for that 
object to look blurry. But it does not follow that blurriness is not a visible aspect of 
the environment.
Blurry vision takes various forms, which can be caused by various factors. Some-
times it results from a general drop in acuity caused by intoxication or fatigue, but 
most often it co-occurs with sharp vision (e.g. a distant object looks blurry when 
one focuses sight on some nearby object). Either way, when we say that an object 
looks blurry, we usually mean that it does not look sharp, where ‘looking sharp’ 
refers to the way that object looks in what we might call ‘normal conditions’ (i.e. 
roughly, from a certain distance, in daylight and in clear air, in the focus of attention 
of a non-intoxicated, non-fatigued human being with healthy sight).
These normal conditions are an anthropocentric idealisation. There is no sin-
gle standard of visual acuity that enables one to see how things in the environment 
‘really’ look. On the contrary, there is a widespread intra-personal, inter-personal, 
and inter-species variation in visual acuity. This gives rise to a paradox analogous to 
the paradox of colour variation discussed above. Even if we narrow the analysis to 
perception in a single species, the same object can look differently in terms of visual 
contrast to two subjects from the same distance, to the same subject from two dif-
ferent distances, to the same subject from the same distance on two different occa-
sions. Add to this inter-species differences in vision and the number of possibilities 
multiplies. Who sees the ‘real’ contrast? And in what conditions? These questions 
generate scepticism about the idea that there is some objective standard of visual 
acuity that determines the way the shape of something really looks. According to 
the sceptic, these questions can only be answered by adopting an arbitrary stand-
ard (relative to the workings of a specific visual system in specific conditions). This 
scepticism is analogous to the scepticism behind colour pluralism, i.e. scepticism 
that there is some objective standard of colour vision that determines which colour 
a given surface really has. If one endorses the latter scepticism, consistency requires 
one to endorse the former. Or at least they owe us a reason why they endorse the lat-
ter but not the former.
Should we conclude that no one ever sees the world the way it really looks? Or 
should we arbitrarily fix some discrete standard of visual acuity that buys one a per-
fectly clear view of the world? Since both options are unacceptable, it seems reason-
able to adopt the selectionist position, according to which all levels of visual acuity 
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reveal different objective aspects of the environment. On this view, the fact that my 
glasses have this look when seen in these circumstances and that look when seen in 
those circumstances does not show that my vision distorts reality in any of the cases. 
The glasses have both looks (and many more), and which of those one sees turns on 
the circumstances of seeing5.
Blurry vision does not reduce to seeing ‘merely determinable locational features’ 
(French 2016, 397) because that would mean that seeing blurry boils down to see-
ing less of the environment than we do in normal conditions. And yet seeing how 
an object looks from a blurred perspective puts one in a position to learn something 
new about that object, i.e. to discover its blurry look, i.e. a genuine visible aspect 
of its shape. While familiarity with blurrier looks of an object usually has less epis-
temic value than familiarity with its sharper looks, in some cases it might be signifi-
cant, e.g. due to aesthetic reasons. Hence seeing blurry is not always an obstacle to 
cognition.
That said, everyday conversations about blurry vision are not simply about the 
ways things look. They are about the ways things look in relation to the anthro-
pocentric standard of normal conditions. Consequently, the ability to distinguish a 
blurry experience from a sharp experience (as well as the ability to distinguish a 
blurry experience of a sharp object from a sharp experience of a fuzzy object) is a 
matter of knowledge about how various things look in various conditions, and how 
the way something looks on a given occasion relates to the way it looks in normal 
conditions. It is not an example of that knowledge that the blurry look of my glasses 
is somehow superimposed on their objective sharp look by my short-sightedness. It 
is an example of that knowledge that my glasses look blurry when seen from a short-
sighted perspective and sharp when seen with a healthy (or corrected) pair of human 
eyes6.
Compare this to Mizrahi’s (2006, 288–89; cf. Kalderon 2011a) suggestion that 
chromatic adaptation (i.e. enervation of colour receptors due to prolonged stimu-
lation) does not result in colour illusion. Instead, previously unseen colours of the 
perceived object become perceptually available. For instance, when the eyes are 
exposed for a long time to a long-wavelength light (e.g. red), the subsequently per-
ceived scene will appear more greenish. While it might seem absurd to insist that the 
resulting experience presents things the way they really are, Mizrahi supports this 
hypothesis with a persuasive example from everyday life. It is a common practice at 
crime scenes to use filters that block light of certain wavelengths. Often this is the 
5 An anonymous referee has pointed out that my proposal is counterintuitive with respect to the way 
people tend to think about blurry vision in every-day situations. This is true, and it can be used against 
one of the motivations behind relationalism, according to which relationalism is superior to other theo-
ries of perception when it comes to being faithful to what common sense tells us about perceptual experi-
ence. I admit that the relationalist who accepts my account of blurry vision has to discard that motiva-
tion. But I do not see this as a high cost, because common sense is itself a highly controversial notion, 
and whatever conception of common sense is adopted, all theories of perception are likely to violate it in 
some respect or other.
6 This account of blurry vision constitutes an alternative reply to Cassam’s objection against Campbell’s 
exposition of relationalism (Campbell and Cassam 2014; French 2016).
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only way to make fingerprints and small amounts of body fluids visible. The result-
ing colour experience is not considered illusory. On the contrary, it is approved in 
court as a perfectly legitimate source of evidence.
If this explanation of chromatic adaptation is viable, blurry vision can be 
explained along the same lines. On this view, blurry vision renders some aspects 
of the environment invisible while rendering some of its other aspects visible. This 
accords with the fact that perception is partial, i.e. that one cannot see the entire 
environment from a single point of view (Kalderon 2007; Campbell 2009).
My diaphaneity-friendly account of blur ties up with the diaphaneity-friendly 
account of the visual field defended above. To see why, consider Skrzypulec’s (Skr-
zypulec 2021a) proposal that visual experience has both exteroceptive and intero-
ceptive content, and that blurriness-related phenomenology interoceptively repre-
sents the state of the visual system (i.e. the acuity of vision in relation to eye focus). 
The rationale behind this view is that blurry vision provides prima facie justifica-
tion for beliefs about the visual system and motivates action towards the eyes (e.g. 
blinking, rubbing eyes). While Skrzypulec is right that blurry phenomenology can 
be indicative of the state of the visual system, it does not follow that I see the state of 
my visual system just by seeing blurry7. Instead, I can infer the acuity of my visual 
system by comparing the way my glasses look when I see them with my naked eyes 
to the way they looked to me when I saw them having my contact lenses on.
To be clear, I am not denying that seeing blurrily can be an indication that some-
thing is wrong with one’s visual system. My point is only that the state of one’s 
vision is not simply seen when one sees blurry. On my proposal, when S sees blur-
rily, things look to S different than they usually look to S. As a result, S uses their 
knowledge about how things look in various circumstances to infer that the potential 
reason why things look different is that their vision malfunctions.
My reply to Skrzypulec is analogous to the one given to French in Sect. 4 because 
both Skrzypulec’s account of blur and French’s account of the visual field share the 
same defect, i.e. they over-intellectualize perceptual phenomenal character. The 
phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is distinct from the truths one can 
come to know in virtue of having that experience. The fact that I can come to know 
certain truths about the boundaries of my visual field (or about the acuity of my 
vision) thanks to having a certain visual experience does not entail that those truths 
are somehow embedded in the phenomenal character of that experience. Perceptual 
experience cannot tell me any truths about itself (nor about anything else) because 
it is silent (Travis 2004). To think otherwise is to conflate seeing things with seeing 
that something is the case (Travis 2018, 344)8.
8 One might object that my reply to French and Skrzypulec presupposes a contentious position about the 
perception/cognition distinction. While defending the latter is beyond the scope of this paper, the mere 
fact that the objector is likely to move the discussion into that area reinforces my point that diaphaneity 
cannot be refuted on purely phenomenological grounds.
7 Skrzypulec claims that his proposal is consistent with metaphysical transparency because he regards 




To sum up, diaphaneity cannot be easily discarded by phenomenological consid-
erations, at least not without adopting some controversial theoretical assumptions. 
In the following sections, I argue that the same point applies to empirical arguments 
against diaphaneity.
6  Attentional Variation
Block (2010) contends that perceptual phenomenal character cannot be explained 
in terms of the perceived items because the relation between the phenomenal char-
acter and the perceived items is contingent. In support of this claim, Block adduces 
a large body of empirical evidence, at the core of which is the study by Carrasco 
et al. (2004). The subjects were presented with a Gabor patch (a grid of sinusoidal 
luminance stripes) to either side of the fixation point and asked to report the orienta-
tion of whichever of the patches had a higher contrast. In some trials, the attention 
of the subjects was cued to one of the patches. In such cases, the subjects were more 
likely to report the orientation of the attended patch when its contrast was equal to, 
or slightly lower than, the contrast of the unattended patch.
According to Block, this shows that attention increases the perceived contrast. 
Other studies cited by Block applied the same paradigm to different variables, and 
their results suggest that not only the perceived contrast, but also saturation, size, 
spatial frequency, gap size and flicker rate can be modulated by attention.
Block believes that this cannot be explained by suggesting that attention modi-
fies perceptual phenomenal character by selecting which features of the environment 
are perceived on a given occasion. Since the perceived item has only one contrast, 
it cannot be said that attention selects which contrast of that item one perceives. On 
Block’s preferred explanation, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is 
a kind of ‘mental paint’, i.e. an intrinsic feature of experience that carries its repre-
sentational content (Block 1996). Mental paint represents the perceived items, but 
it can vary independently of them. This is typically illustrated with thought experi-
ments about inverted spectrum (e.g. the possibility that one’s experiences of red and 
green swap their phenomenal characters). The mental paint view easily accommo-
dates the possibility that shifts in attention can modify perceptual phenomenal char-
acter without any change in what is perceived.
In response to Block, Brewer (2013) insists that the selectionist explanation can 
be applied to the evidence at issue. Brewer’s reply trades on the distinction between 
thin and thick looks. To say that an object O thinly looks F to the subject S is to say 
that, when perceived by S on a given occasion, O exhibits visually relevant similari-
ties with paradigm exemplars of F. When S not only sees O but also sees that O is F 
(i.e. recognises O as an instance of F), O not only thinly but also thickly looks F to S. 
Hence recognition is always accompanied with a phenomenological change.
A single object has plenty of thin looks, in that it visually resembles many 
things at the same time. It exhibits visual similarities to paradigm exemplars of F, 
G, H, and so on. Recognizing an object as an instance of one of those categories 
is partially a matter of focusing on some of those thin looks while ignoring oth-
ers. When O is recognised as an instance of a category, say F, it still thinly looks 
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to S in all those ways (F, G, H…), but now it also thickly looks to S in only one 
way (F).
Brewer (2013, 430) applies this framework to Carrasco and colleagues’ results:
A given Gabor patch viewed from a fixed point of view and in fixed circum-
stances has visually relevant similarities with paradigms lying in a range 
around its actual intensity. Greater attention involves greater discrimination 
with respect to the difference between the dark and light bands and hence 
induces registration of similarities with paradigms of greater intensity. Less 
attention involves less discrimination between light and dark bands and 
hence induces registration of similarities with paradigms of less intensity.
Brewer (2013, 431–32) is also quite explicit that the interpretation he offers is 
a form of selectionism:
what is phenomenally salient to us about the particular worldly objects of 
our acquaintance also depends upon our interest and attention. But this sim-
ply serves to select among what is there to be seen, on the present proposal, 
resulting in the registration of some and not other visually relevant similari-
ties. […] there is at least a sense in which it does not even seem to be the 
experience of an objective variation in the stimulus itself. [...] on the other 
hand, this comes out in the extent to which variation in registration is evi-
dently a variation in the recognition or registration of what is there anyway: 
a selection among different aspects of the stimulus itself. In one sense, the 
stimulus looks different, attended versus unattended, and in another it does 
not.
Brewer’s explanation is clearly consistent with diaphaneity and selectionism. 
But does it explain the evidence better than Block’s mental paint explanation? 
Brewer’s position is controversial in that it entails that the contrast of a single 
object has multiple visible aspects. The idea is that a Gabor patch can simultane-
ously thinly look both 22% and 28% contrast while thickly looking 28% contrast. 
According to Beck (2019a, 621–23), this proposal fails to distinguish competing 
from non-competing looks. Looks F and G compete if nothing can look both F 
and G to a normal perceiver under normal conditions. Since the patches in the 
Carrasco and colleagues’ study were perceived by normal perceivers in normal 
conditions, their contrast looks were competing. Nothing looks both 22% and 
28% contrast to a normal perceiver under normal conditions.
However, it is far from obvious that the conditions in that study were normal. 
As Beck and Schneider (2017) point out, Carrasco and colleagues’ results do 
not unequivocally show that attention changes the appearance of the stimulus by 
increasing its contrast. They suggest that attention merely increased the salience 
of the stimuli, which was then mistaken for a boost in contrast by the subjects. 
The probability of this mistake was very high due to uncertainty-generating con-
ditions of the task.
Considering that the stimuli were presented to the subjects for a fraction of 
a second and the subjects had only one second to respond, this is a plausible 
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interpretation. What makes it even more compelling is the fact that the attentional 
effect vanishes when the experimental paradigm is changed. When the subjects 
were asked whether the stimuli have the same intensity or not (instead of being 
asked which of the two stimuli is more intense), whereas the stimuli and the rest 
of the procedures were just as in the original Carrasco and colleagues’ study, no 
effect of attention was observed (Schneider and Komlos 2008). The same prob-
lem affects other studies cited by Block. In all those experiments, the perceived 
intensity was likely to be confounded with a decision bias.
According to Beck and Schneider (2017, 486), their interpretation does not 
vindicate any selectionist account such as Brewer’s. For it remains incumbent on 
the selectionist to identify an objective feature of the Gabor patch that is rendered 
visible thanks to an increase in salience caused by attention, and J. Beck and Sch-
neider are sceptical about that. They explain attentional variation by postulating 
‘mental primer’, a qualitative feature of perceptual experience caused by con-
scious attention. Mental primer is irreducible to the perceived items (like mental 
paint) but does not represent anything (unlike mental paint). Mental primer is 
also different from qualia because it has a function. It realizes functional salience, 
i.e. increases the probability that the stimulus will be selected for action and cog-
nition (Beck and Schneider 2017, 484, 489–90).
Beck and Schneider (2017, 483–84) argue that functional salience is distinct 
from phenomenal salience (i.e. the phenomenal character of consciously attend-
ing) because (i) attention can occur unconsciously, and (ii) the salience of a 
stimulus causally explains why the stimulus becomes attended, which means that 
salience precedes attention. Recall that J. Beck and Schneider’s interpretation of 
Carrasco and colleagues’ experiments is that attention increases salience. I take it 
that the stimulus O is already salient to some extent before it becomes attended. 
Becoming attended does not render O salient; it just increases O’s salience.
At this point, however, it seems that positing mental primer is unnecessary. 
Why not attribute the pre-attentional salience of O to its thickly looking F? And 
why not think that the increase of the probability that O will be selected for action 
and cognition due to its being consciously attended (the alleged function of men-
tal primer) is in fact a matter of O’s even thicker looking F due to its becoming 
consciously attended?
The selectionist can offer the following alternative to mental primer. When S 
recognises O as F, S’s associations and beliefs concerning O become actuated. 
Consciously attending to O arguably amplifies that process. On the phenomeno-
logical level, S’s recognising O as F results in O’s thickly looking F to S, which 
in turn renders O’s F-ness salient to S. That salience attracts attention. When con-
sciously attended, an F-looking O will strike S as an instance of F more than 
before (i.e. it will make O look F to S even more thickly, and thereby render O’s 
F-ness even more salient).
One might object that functional salience can be unconscious, whereas thickly 
looking F is supposed to be conscious. However, Brewer’s account can be modi-
fied by allowing for unconscious phenomenal character, and unconscious thin and 
thick looks (see Sect. 8).
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In contrast to mental paint view, Brewer’s account does not hinge on Block’s 
interpretation of the evidence. It can be adapted to Beck and Schneider’s interpreta-
tion. What is more, it is an advantage of Brewer’s view that it explains attentional 
variation in accordance with selectionism and diaphaneity. For if mental paint (or 
mental primer) are involved in perceptual phenomenal character, it should be pos-
sible to shift attention from the perceived items to the intrinsic properties of percep-
tual experience. However, as Weksler et  al. (2021) point out, that possibility is at 
odds with the current state of art in the neuroscience of sensory attention.
The relevant theories construe sensory attention as a modulation of the neural 
basis of perception (N), which leaves no room for attention to mental paint (or men-
tal primer, for that matter). For example, suppose that sensory attention consists 
in shrinking the Receptive Field (a part of the retina to which the neural basis of 
perception responds) by modulating N. While such a change clearly modifies the 
sensory access to perceived items, there is no reason to believe that it adds any addi-
tional qualitative layer to perceptual phenomenal character.
The topic of attentional variation is complex, and much more would have to be 
said to make a compelling case for the claim that selectionism explains that phe-
nomenon better than the competition. Still, contrary to what the critics have sug-
gested, it is far from obvious that such an account is a non-starter.
7  Irregular Grounding
Pautz (2017, forthcoming) argues that diaphaneity is undermined by a juxtaposition 
of empirical findings in psychophysics and neuroscience. On the one hand, qualita-
tive similarity is poorly correlated with external (i.e. extra-dermal) physical proper-
ties. On the other hand, qualitative similarity is well-correlated with internal (i.e. 
neural) physical properties. Pautz adduces three examples of this.
First, while the phenomenal character of seeing a blue-looking ball is more simi-
lar to that of seeing purple-looking grapes than that of seeing a green-looking leaf, 
the reflectance of the blue-looking ball happens to be more similar to that of the leaf 
than that of the grapes. This indicates that differences and similarities in reflectance 
and illumination fail to predict differences and similarities in phenomenal charac-
ter, whereas differences and similarities in neural activity do predict differences and 
similarities in phenomenal character (MacAdam 1985; Brouwer and Heeger 2013; 
Bohon et al. 2016).
Second, the phenomenal character of smelling R-limonene resembles that of cit-
ral more than that of R-carvone even though R-limonene is much more similar to 
R-carvone than to citral in terms of chemical structure. And yet the neural activ-
ity associated with smelling R-limonene resembles the one associated with smelling 
citral more than that associated with smelling R-carvone. It turns out that olfactory 
experiences, just as visual experiences, are better correlated with patterns of neu-
ral activity than with physical properties of the environment (Margot 2009; Howard 
et al. 2009).
Third, there can be large categorical changes in audible qualities, accompanied 
with corresponding changes at the level of neural activity, that occur without any 
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corresponding physical changes in the auditory stimulus (Goldstein 2009; Chang 
et  al. 2010). Yet another case of ‘good internal correlation’ and ‘bad external 
correlation’.
The evidence clearly suggests that the qualities comprising the phenomenal char-
acter of perceptual experience fall into a different resemblance-order than the physi-
cal properties of the perceived items. Pautz draws two conclusions from this. First, 
phenomenal qualities are not identical to external physical properties. For if they 
were, phenomenal qualities should fall into the same resemblance order as external 
physical properties, which, as it turns out, is not the case. Second, it is implausible 
that phenomenal qualities are distinct from external physical properties but none-
theless somehow grounded in the latter. For, given the bad external correlation and 
the good internal correlation, such grounding relation would have to be completely 
irregular and unsystematic. It would be ‘just a quirk of reality with no explanation’ 
(Pautz 2017, 27–28).
Pautz does not go as far as to say that reducing phenomenal qualities to physi-
cal properties necessarily requires that both types of properties fall into the same 
resemblance order. But he does think that reduction is highly implausible if both 
types of properties fall into different resemblance orders. That would require irregu-
lar grounding, and in Pautz’s opinion ‘it goes without saying’ that we should avoid 
irregular grounding (Pautz forthcoming, 15). Although I am not entirely convinced 
of this explanatory norm, I follow it here for the sake of the argument because I want 
to show that selectionism and diaphaneity are not undermined even if Pautz is right.
Suppose for a moment that the norm is wrong, and irregular grounding is toler-
able. This paves the way for objectivist reductionism, according to which phenom-
enal qualities can reduce to external physical properties despite the difference in 
resemblance orders. However, it also allows the selectionist to retreat to their previ-
ous position, according to which phenomenal qualities are distinct from, but some-
how grounded in, external physical properties. In fact, rejecting the norm still leaves 
objectivist primitivism in a better position than objectivist reductionism, because the 
difference in resemblance orders provides the primitivist with an additional reason 
to resist the reduction of phenomenal qualities to external physical properties.
By interpreting the evidence in accordance with the norm, Pautz formulates two 
arguments against the relational theory of perception. The first argument is an infer-
ence to the best explanation. A brain-based theory of perceptual phenomenal char-
acter can explain the evidence in question without the appeal to irregular ground-
ing. If the phenomenal character is realized by brain activity in response to external 
stimulation, no systematic correlation between phenomenal qualities and external 
physical properties is required. By contrast, relationalism appears to be committed 
to irregular grounding, at least insofar as it is committed to something like diaphane-
ity. On this view, phenomenal qualities are just sensory qualities (or aspects thereof) 
grounded in external physical properties. But the evidence suggests that the nature 
of such grounding relation would have to be completely random. Therefore, we 
should opt for the brain-based view and reject relationalism (Pautz forthcoming, 9).
The second argument trades on a Twin Earth thought experiment. Consider a 
counterfactual counterpart of yourself that is identical to you in every respect except 
for one thing: their neural response to R-limonene resembles their neural response to 
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R-carvone more than their neural response to citral (which, as the evidence suggests, 
is the exact opposite to how things stand in the actual world). Given the evidence 
that the neural response is a much better predictor of the phenomenal character than 
the physical structure of the environment, it seems that R-limonene should smell dif-
ferently to your counterpart than it does to you. And yet relationalism, at least inso-
far as it is committed to diaphaneity, seems to predict that R-limonene smells the 
same to you and to your counterpart because you are both sniffing the same chemical 
substance in the same circumstances. In the light of the evidence adduced by Pautz, 
this is a wrong prediction. Construing perception in terms of selectionism does not 
help because your perceptual systems select the same physical features of the envi-
ronment (Pautz forthcoming, 17–20). It actually exacerbates the problem, since the 
view that each reflectance grounds infinitely many colours entails that there are infi-
nitely many instances of irregular grounding (Pautz forthcoming, 27–28)9.
The actual target of these arguments is diaphaneity. It is no accident that phi-
losophers sympathetic to relationalism tend to respond by distancing themselves 
from diaphaneity (see Sect. 9). And conversely, if diaphaneity is true, there must be 
something wrong with the arguments. Indeed, I think that there is a lacuna in both 
arguments. According to diaphaneity, perceptual phenomenal character is entirely 
constituted by the perceived items. But it does not follow that the phenomenal char-
acter is grounded in external physical properties. And yet the arguments require that 
entailment to be true. Phenomenal qualities cannot be irregularly grounded in exter-
nal physical properties if they are not grounded in any physical properties at all.
This observation does not save reductionist selectionism. As mentioned in Sect. 2, 
the latter identifies colours with reflectance properties. If colour experience is well-
correlated with neural properties and poorly correlated with reflectance properties, 
reductionist selectionism is in jeopardy.
Things are different when it comes to primitivist selectionism, however. Take col-
ours for example. Primitivism construes them as non-physical, i.e. non-identical to 
reflectance properties (nor any other physical property). Although primitivist selec-
tionists tend to argue that colours supervene on physical properties of the perceived 
items (see e.g. Allen 2016, 75), this is optional. Neither primitivism nor selection-
ism entails that colours depend on reflectance properties for their existence. To keep 
primitivism compatible with vision science, it suffices to say that colours depend on 
reflectance properties for their visibility. The fact that a coloured object has reflec-
tance properties makes it possible for subjects endowed with appropriate visual sys-
tems to see its colours. But it does not follow that the object has its colours in virtue 
9 On top of that, Pautz claims that denying that the evidence he adduced undermines relationalism is 
tantamount to saying that relationalism is ‘empirically indefeasible’ which he thinks is ‘an absurd stance’ 
because relationalism is at least in part ‘an empirical thesis about how experience is to be integrated 
with the natural world’ (Pautz forthcoming, 25). I disagree. Relationalism is a position in metaphysics of 
perception, and it is common knowledge in philosophy that metaphysical claims do not admit of straight-
forward empirical disconfirmation. Empirical evidence certainly does matter for deciding which meta-
physical position is preferable. But to argue that a metaphysical claim can be undermined by an empirical 
experiment is to endorse scientism, which itself is a highly contentious metaphilosophical attitude.
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of having its reflectance properties10. As far as primitivism is concerned, the object 
might have two types of properties, physical and non-physical, none of which is 
more fundamental than the other11.
Importantly, I am not suggesting that we see colours by seeing physical proper-
ties (which would render colour perception indirect). We do not see photons striking 
the retina, reflectance properties, nor their microphysical realizers. The suggestion is 
rather that all these physical properties enable us to see the object’s colour, a quality 
that that object has independently of having its physical properties.
The fact that the phenomenal character of colour experience is well-correlated 
with neural properties and poorly correlated with reflectance properties does not 
entail that the phenomenal character of colour experience is poorly correlated with 
mind-independent non-physical properties. And it is far from clear that reflectance 
properties must fall into the same resemblance-order with colours qua mind-inde-
pendent primitive non-physical properties to enable the visibility of the latter. Given 
the good correlation between colours and neural properties, it might be the case that 
factors such as reflectance and illumination render a certain amount of an object’s 
colours visible, and the neural activity selects which of those colours ultimately gets 
seen on a given occasion.
This version of primitivist selectionism is not undermined by the arguments put 
forward by Pautz. It does not require irregular grounding because it does not claim 
that the phenomenal character of colour perception is grounded in external physical 
properties. Neither does it predict that R-limonene smells the same to you and your 
counterfactual twin whose neural response to that substance is different from yours. 
For on this view the neural activity responsible for olfactory perception does not 
select external physical properties of the perceived object. It selects non-physical 
properties (i.e. smells qua sensory qualities) in virtue of the fact that the perceived 
objects have certain physical properties that enable perception of those qualities.
For this reply to work, it is not necessary to show that sensory qualities really are 
non-physical properties rendered perceptually accessible to us by physical properties 
of their bearers. It suffices to show that the evidence adduced by Pautz admits of this 
interpretation. I see no obvious reason why not.
An anonymous referee has objected that there is an internal tension in my reply 
to Pautz. Given that I follow Pautz in assuming that irregular grounding should be 
avoided because it would be ‘a quirk of reality with no explanation’ if phenome-
nal qualities were grounded in external physical properties, why don’t I think that it 
would be ‘a quirk of reality with no explanation’ that the visibility of phenomenal 
qualities is grounded in external physical properties?
Let me respond using colour perception as an example. It is an empirical fact 
that certain physical properties have to be instantiated (both in the subject and in the 
10 Put differently, it is conceivable that an object has colours but lacks reflectance properties (cf. Allen 
2016, 77).
11 It might be objected that my proposal renders colours causally inefficacious. But the objection pre-
supposes the mechanistic conception of causation, which is optional and controversial. As Allen (2016, 
102–4) points out, causal powers of colours are best understood in terms of difference-making, not in 
terms of mechanistic processes. Allen’s point spreads to other sensory qualities.
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environment) for colour perception to occur. The evidence adduced by Pautz sug-
gests that external physical properties do not settle which colour is perceived. But 
the evidence does not show that external physical properties play no role in colour 
perception. It does not rule out that, on each occasion of colour perception, which 
colour is perceived is co-determined by external and internal physical properties. 
And that is all I need for my reply to work. According to my proposal, there are col-
ours in the environment, and when certain physical properties are instantiated, one 
becomes perceptually aware of some of those colours. There is nothing mysterious 
in this account. The finding that colours fall into different resemblance order than 
external physical properties does not make my account incomprehensible because 
on my account external physical properties (i) do not determine what colours are, 
and (ii) render colours visible if and only if certain internal physical properties 
are instantiated that do fall into the same resemblance order as colours. Of course, 
one might find this view counterintuitive and/or inconsistent with some claims one 
strongly believes to be true, but the view is not unintelligible. The proposal would 
be unintelligible (or at least very difficult to comprehend and motivate) if it claimed 
that external physical properties (i) determine what colours are, and/or (i) render 
colours visible independently of what internal physical properties are instantiated.
This brings me to the second issue raised by an anonymous referee. Assuming 
that my reply works, could the objectivist reductionist reply in the same way? I do 
not think so. The objectivist reductionist claims that phenomenal qualities reduce to 
external physical properties. But if these two types of properties fall into different 
resemblance orders, it is mysterious how the reduction is supposed to work. In the 
case of objectivist reductionism, the problem is not just that the view under con-
sideration is counterintuitive or inconsistent with something we believe. The main 
problem is that we have merely superficial understanding of what the view says, 
which is much worse.
At this point, it might be objected that the brain-based view provides a more com-
pelling interpretation of the evidence than objectivist primitivism. If the phenom-
enal character is strongly correlated with neural properties and badly correlated with 
reflectance properties, what reason is there left to think that the phenomenal charac-
ter is comprised of mind-independent qualities?
First, my proposal neatly explains why the phenomenal character of shape experi-
ence is much better correlated with external physical properties than the phenomenal 
character of colour experience (Logue 2012, 215–16; Pautz forthcoming, 33). For 
this is only to be expected if colours, contrary to shapes, are not physical properties.
An anonymous referee suggests the following response on behalf of the brain-
based theorist: ‘If the primitivist can posit a primitive fact that colours are such 
that they can be seen when certain physical properties are instantiated, I can posit 
a primitive fact that the phenomenal character of shape experience is much better 
correlated with external physical properties than the phenomenal character of colour 
experience.’
Still, I think that the appeal to a primitive fact is more innocent in the case of 
objectivist primitivism. For the objectivist primitivist, secondary qualities such as 
colours are on a par with primary qualities, in the sense that they are considered 
fundamental features of the world, along with mass and location. On this view, it is 
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expectable that some facts about secondary qualities will be primitive. For the brain-
based theorist, by contrast, phenomenal qualities are not fundamental constituents 
of reality; they are clusters of physical properties produced in the brain in response 
to some other cluster of physical properties occurring in the environment. It seems 
much more suspicious to say that it is a primitive fact that <the cluster to which 
the phenomenal character of shape experience reduces> is much better correlated 
with external clusters than <the cluster to which the phenomenal character of colour 
experience reduces>. After all, these clusters are not fundamental features of reality; 
they are high-level complexes of physical properties. Appealing to primitive facts 
in the explanation of how various high-level complexes of physical properties are 
related is arguably more suspicious than appealing to primitive facts in character-
izing fundamental features of reality.
Second, primitivist selectionism preserves colour objectivism, and thereby ‘does 
justice to the phenomenology of colour experiences in locating colours exactly 
where they appear to be, that is, on the surfaces of objects’ (Mizrahi 2006, 286). 
A similar point can be made about smells and sounds. While the brain-based view 
construes perceptual experience as an internal alteration of the subject, selectionism 
emphasizes that perceptual experience is first and foremost a mode of sensitivity to 
the environment (Kalderon 2018).
While not everyone accepts these desiderata, questioning them shifts the debate 
into a completely different dimension. It turns out, unsurprisingly, that the status 
of selectionism does not depend exclusively on empirical evidence, but also on the 
underlying assumptions determining how the evidence is interpreted. What lesson is 
there to be drawn from the evidence turns on underlying metaphysical assumptions 
about the nature of phenomenal qualities, as well as on meta-philosophical assump-
tions concerning what makes a satisfactory philosophical explanation.
8  Unconscious Perception
One of the main threads in contemporary philosophy of perception concerns the 
plausibility and ramifications of the following hypothesis:
(UP) Mental episodes of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious 
seeing can occur unconsciously.
UP is supported by a great deal of evidence (see e.g. Block 2011, 2012; Breit-
meyer 2015; Prinz 2010; Weiskrantz 1986). Unconscious seeing is claimed to occur 
in certain clinical cases (e.g. blindsight, unilateral neglect, visual agnosia), as well 
as in experimentally induced cases (e.g. priming, continuous flash suppression). In 
all these cases, the subjects report no consciousness of a visual stimulus even though 
objective measures indicate that the latter has influenced their behaviour and/or 
brain activity. While the move from that evidence to UP has been questioned (Phil-
lips 2018; 2016a), the opposition to UP itself rests on some controversial assump-
tions (Berger and Mylopoulos 2019, Zięba 2019), which means that the hypothesis 
should be taken seriously.
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Beck (2020) argues that UP constitutes a reason to reject selectionism and diaph-
aneity. Compare seeing a red dot consciously and unconsciously. A straightforward 
explanation of the difference between the two cases is that conscious seeing of the 
dot has a phenomenal character, whereas unconscious seeing of the dot does not. If 
so, there can be pairs of perceptual episodes such that the same item is perceived in 
both cases and yet there is a difference between them in phenomenal character. This 
undermines diaphaneity because the latter is incompatible with the possibility that 
two perceptual episodes differ with respect to phenomenal character even though 
the same item is perceived in both cases. Since selectionism entails diaphaneity, the 
inconsistency between diaphaneity and UP entails that selectionism is also incom-
patible with UP.
But diaphaneity is not inconsistent with UP. Quite on the contrary, diaphaneity 
predicts and supports UP. If diaphaneity is true, whatever has the property of being 
a constituent of the phenomenal character of a perception, it has that property con-
tingently (it is not essentially a property of a mental state). It follows that perceptual 
phenomenal character is entirely mind-independent, which makes it entirely con-
sciousness-independent as well. Consequently, diaphaneity entails the logical pos-
sibility of unconscious perceptual phenomenal character. And while the latter does 
not yet entail UP, it introduces a conception of perceptual phenomenology according 
to which it makes perfect sense to interpret the evidence mentioned at the beginning 
of this section in terms of UP.
To illustrate, compare two perceptual episodes: (a) S sees O consciously, and (b) 
S sees O unconsciously. Suppose that there can be a difference between (a) and (b) 
that goes beyond the fact that the former is conscious while the latter is not. The 
idea is that the episode (a) is not just a conscious copy of the episode (b), because 
becoming conscious made (a) inherently different from (b). Skrzypulec (2021b) has 
recently argued that such a difference might exist between conscious and uncon-
scious colour perception. If this is true, it is a substantial reason to be sceptical about 
UP (the strength of the reason turns on the significance of the difference). But it 
is only true if diaphaneity is false. For if diaphaneity is true, consciousness can-
not change a perceptual episode like that. Diaphaneity rules out the possibility that 
perceptual phenomenal character or perceptual content can change just by becoming 
conscious. Therefore, UP is more plausible if diaphaneity is true.
O. Beck’s argument presupposes, in accordance with the tradition, that there is 
no such thing as unconscious phenomenal character. But this traditional assumption 
is disputable. Marvan and Polák (2017) present a series of arguments to the conclu-
sion that phenomenal character does not depend on consciousness for its existence12. 
Interestingly, one of those arguments is based on empirical results that are some-
times mentioned as the strongest available evidence for UP, namely studies suggest-
ing that colours can be seen unconsciously (Boyer et al. 2005; Railo et al. 2012; Ro 
et al. 2009; Norman et al. 2014; Moutoussis and Zeki 2002). If colours constitute the 
phenomenal character of colour perception, and colours can be seen unconsciously, 
12 The idea of unconscious phenomenal character is inspired by Rosenthal’s insistence that the existence 
of mental qualities does not depend on their being conscious (Rosenthal 2010).
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the phenomenal character of colour perception is consciousness-independent. If a 
perception is conscious, its phenomenal character determines what it is like to have 
that perception. Because the phenomenal character of unconscious perception is not 
conscious, there is nothing it is like to undergo unconscious perception13.
If perceptual phenomenal character can be unconscious, it is not true that con-
sciously seeing a red dot and unconsciously seeing the same dot constitute a pair of 
perceptual episodes that differ in phenomenal character despite being the same with 
respect to what is perceived.
However, as I have argued in the previous section, the evidence adduced by 
Pautz suggests that selectionism is only viable if coupled with primitivism, whereas 
Marvan and Polák’s view is embedded in a brain-based view of phenomenal char-
acter. They claim that conscious perceptual experience results from an interaction 
between two neural mechanisms: one generates the phenomenal character, the other 
renders that phenomenal character conscious. On that view, unconscious perception 
occurs when the second mechanism malfunctions (Polák and Marvan 2019, 2). Is it 
possible to implement the idea of unconscious phenomenal character into the rela-
tionalist-primitivist framework?
Some relationalists might respond ‘no’. The orthodox formulation of relation-
alism construes perception as a ’modification of consciousness’ by conscious 
acquaintance with a mind-independent object (Brewer 2011, 92). This raises a 
worry: how could this acquaintance be sometimes conscious and sometimes not? 
How could unconscious perception instantiate acquaintance with a mind-independ-
ent object if that object makes ’no contribution to the subject’s conscious perspec-
tive on the world’ (Phillips 2018, 472)? It would seem that ‘unconscious acquaint-
ance’ is an oxymoron, as it appears to imply that the subject can be ‘unconsciously 
conscious’ of the environment (French and Phillips forthcoming).
This problem is not as serious as it may seem. Consider the core of the relational 
view, i.e. the claim that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is consti-
tuted by the mind-independent object. Neither does this claim entail that perceptual 
phenomenal character is inherently conscious, nor does it follow from it that percep-
tion and consciousness cannot dissociate. The core of relationalism is silent as far as 
UP is concerned (cf. Zięba 2019).
Relationalism holds that what it is like to consciously perceive an object is deter-
mined by the properties that object has independently of being perceived. Since 
these properties are mind-independent, they are consciousness-independent as well. 
As the constituents of perceptual phenomenal character, they are phenomenal quali-
ties. But they are not phenomenal in the sense of being inherently conscious. They 
are phenomenal in the sense of determining what it is like to perceive them when 
they are consciously perceived. Now add to this the possibility of a mental episode 
that resembles conscious perception in almost every respect (e.g. it guides action 
and causes belief formation), except that there is nothing it is like to be in it. Assum-
ing that what-is-like-ness is a mark of consciousness, our hypothetical episode 




clearly instantiates perception without consciousness. What else could it be? Again, 
the core of relationalism does not give us any reason to deny that perceptual relation 
could occur unconsciously, which is partially because it does not entail that percep-
tual phenomenal character is inherently conscious.
As far as I can tell, the only way to resist this point is to supplement relationalism 
with the claim that relationalism pertains to perception qua personal state whereas 
evidence for UP only justifies countenancing unconscious perception qua sub-per-
sonal state (French and Phillips forthcoming; Phillips 2018). This would suggest 
that conscious perception and unconscious perception are not perceptions in the 
same sense of ‘perception’.
But this is not convincing because the supplementary claim (i) is distinct from 
relationalism, which makes it optional for the relationalist; (ii) rests on the contro-
versial assumption that the distinction between personal and sub-personal levels of 
explanation maps onto a corresponding distinction between personal and sub-per-
sonal states (Bermúdez 2000; Wong 2014; Drayson 2012); (iii) undermines UP and 
thereby does not really lend itself to salvage O. Beck’s argument.
9  Objectivism Without Selectionism?
Even if selectionism and diaphaneity emerge unscathed from the criticism discussed 
above, it might be suggested that there are better ways to preserve the objectivity of 
perceptual phenomenal character.
French and Phillips (2020) argue that it is possible to retain relationalism (and 
thereby also objectivism about phenomenal qualities such as colours) without the 
appeal to selectionism. Central to their proposal is the rejection of the following 
consequence of diaphaneity:
(Difference Principle) Necessarily, if two experiences differ in phenomenal 
character, then they differ in character-constituting presented elements.
Consider a red car under streetlights, looking orange to a human observer. 
According to selectionism, the car is both red and orange, and which of these col-
ours is visible turns on whether it is seen in daylight or under streetlights. This 
analysis accords with the difference principle, in that it explains the phenomenal 
character solely in terms of the perceived items. French and Phillips consider attrib-
uting orangeness to the car unnecessary to explain why the car looks orange under 
streetlights. In their view, it suffices to say that the redness of the car looks orange 
when seen in this way (i.e. by this subject, in this illumination, etc.). By ‘redness 
looks orange’, they mean that (a) the psychological impact redness has on the sub-
ject when seen under streetlights is similar in the relevant way to (b) the psychologi-
cal impact orangeness has on the subject when seen in daylight (French and Phillips 
2020, 12). On this view, ‘[t]he car’s orange look is simply its red color’ (French and 
Phillips 2020, 13).
This proposal was put forward as an alternative to selectionism and diaphaneity. 
In particular, French and Phillips claim that their view is incompatible with the Dif-
ference Principle on the grounds that it explains perceptual phenomenal character 
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not only in terms of the perceived items, but also in terms of the ways in which those 
items are perceived. However, closer inspection reveals that this view it is either 
(i) implicitly committed to selectionism and diaphaneity, or (ii) explanatorily idle. 
Whether (i) or (ii) is the case turns on how the claim that a single item can be per-
ceived in many different ways is interpreted.
We have already seen that French and Phillips specify the difference in ways of 
perceiving in terms of the difference in psychological impact the perceived item has 
on the subject. One could take this as suggesting that ways of perceiving do not con-
cern the environment at all; they solely capture something about the subject (e.g. the 
reaction of the perceptual system to the stimulus on various occasions). But it would 
be a mistake to conceive of the ways of perceiving in this way.
Suppose that the car’s redness is perceived on the two occasions, but in different 
ways. The activity in the perceptual system is also different on the two occasions. 
But the appeal to the difference in perceptual processing does not fully explain the 
phenomenal difference. A comprehensive explanation of the phenomenal difference 
has to mention the fact that the perceptual system is stimulated differently on the 
two occasions.
Consequently, there seems to be no way around the claim that it is the car’s red-
ness that looks different on the two occasions, i.e. that the car’s redness has two 
different sensible aspects that are perceived on the two occasions. Because the com-
plete explanation of the difference between various looks of the car’s redness has to 
mention the difference in environmental stimulation of the perceptual system, the 
phenomenal difference in question is a difference in what is perceived on the two 
occasions, not just in how the brain reacts to what is perceived14.
But now the claim that what we are considering is an alternative to selectionism 
and diaphaneity is hard to believe, since the account in question entails that each 
colour has multiple looks, and which of those looks one sees turns on the way in 
which one sees that colour. How is this different from selectionism? After all, it 
would make perfect sense for the selectionist to say that which objective look of the 
object is selected by the perceptual system on a given occasion is a matter of the 
way in which the subject is related to that object. And this formulation of selection-
ism is clearly not incompatible with the Difference Principle15. If so, why think that 
French and Phillips’ view is?
This objection cannot be rebutted by insisting that it is the same property (i.e. 
redness) that is seen in daylight and under streetlights. Denying that the subject is 
aware of different properties in these cases renders the explanation unintelligible. 
Even if we grant that red has an orange look, that look is distinct from red’s red look. 
14 An anonymous referee asked: ‘Why can’t we say that there is one colour, and our brain interprets 
it differently under different environmental conditions?’ I think one can say that, but this possibility is 
unacceptable for the relationalist because it suggests that the properties that constitute perceptual phe-
nomenal character are produced in the brain, which is precisely what relationalism denies.
15 The account offered by French and Phillips would be incompatible with the Difference Principle if the 
way of perceiving was manifest in perceptual phenomenal character in the same way in which the per-
ceived items are. But, as we have seen in the previous sections, there are strong reasons to the contrary.
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Otherwise the account fails to explain the phenomenological difference between the 
two cases (cf. Pautz forthcoming, 30–31).
In response, French and Phillips could suggest that their view only says that the 
car’s redness looks red in daylight and orange under streetlights because it is seen 
in a different way in each case, period. In other words, they could dig in their heels 
and insist that the phenomenal difference is exhaustively explained by the claim that 
the car is perceived in a different way in each case. But this would effectively render 
their account explanatorily idle. If the proposal in question were limited to the claim 
that the car’s redness looks red in daylight and orange under streetlights because it 
is seen in a different way in each case, it would be a virtus dormitiva explanation 
(it would merely restate the explanandum in different words). Everyone can agree 
that the car looks red in daylight and orange under streetlights because it is seen 
in a different way in each case. The question is what this difference amounts to, 
i.e. what constitutes the phenomenological difference between the two cases16. Why 
two experiences of the same car (in daylight vs. under streetlights) have different 
phenomenal characters? Put differently, why does the car look different on the two 
occasions? A possible explanans is the claim that the car is perceived in different 
ways on the two occasions. But what does it mean that the car is perceived in differ-
ent ways? Given the foregoing, it seems that the only plausible relationalist answer 
to this question is selectionism.
A real alternative to selectionism is Beck’s view (2019a; 2019b). While this 
account also revolves around the claim that an object can be perceived in differ-
ent ways, it develops it in a way that is evidently inconsistent with diaphaneity and 
selectionism.
O. Beck proposes to analyse perception in terms of a three-place relation ‘x per-
ceptually appears W to S’. The relata are the subject S, the appearance property W 
instantiated by S, and the mind-independent item x. On this view, perceptual phe-
nomenology is partially constituted by W (i.e. the way S is appeared to), which is 
entirely determined by S’s neuro-computational properties, and partially by the 
perceived item x. W accommodates empirical evidence discussed above (e.g. atten-
tional variation, good internal correlation) and the similarity between perception and 
hallucination, x accounts for the relationality of perception.
This account is intended as a middle way between intentionalism and relation-
alism about perception. The former construes perceptual phenomenal character as 
consistent with inexistence of the perceived object, whereas the latter views it as 
inconsistent with inexistence of the perceived object. Beck (2019b) thinks that this 
is because each of these two accounts presupposes a different conception of phe-
nomenology. Intentionalism is based on a narrow conception, according to which 
perceptual phenomenal character is exhausted by the way the subject is appeared 
to. Relationalism is based on a broad conception, according to which perceptual 
phenomenal character is the way a certain object appears to the subject. O. Beck’s 
16 Incidentally, the account at issue structurally resembles a version of intentionalism that differentiates 
perception from sensory imagination in terms of modes of presentation, which is subject to the same 
objection (see Bourget 2017, 683).
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view is supposed to accommodate both conceptions: W accommodates the nar-
row conception, whereas the ‘x appears W to S’ relation accommodates the broad 
conception.
Although this view avoids the controversies surrounding selectionism and diaph-
aneity, it faces other difficulties. The main problem is that the narrow vs. broad phe-
nomenology distinction does not seem to accurately represent the dialectics in the 
intentionalism vs. relationalism debate. For it implies that both parties have been 
talking past each other for over two decades now, which is highly improbable. As I 
understand it, relationalism claims that the way the subject is appeared to when they 
perceive an object just is the way that object appears to the subject (cf. Brewer 2013, 
422: ‘What it is like for the subject is what it—the perceived object itself—is like, 
for the subject’)17. The intentionalist disagrees because they believe that the sub-
ject can be appeared to in the same way no matter whether the subject is perceiving 
or merely hallucinating. The bone of contention is whether perceptual phenomenal 
character is essentially relational, i.e. whether perceptual phenomenal character is at 
least partially constituted by the perceived items. Hence relationalism is inconsistent 
with O. Beck’s claim (Beck 2019a, 625) that the way the subject is appeared to is a 
property of the subject which is fully determined by the subject’s neuro-computa-
tional properties.
Furthermore, the relationalist will reject the accusation of neglecting the narrow 
conception of phenomenology simply because they believe that the correct concep-
tion of perceptual phenomenology (i.e. phenomenology of genuine perception as 
opposed to hallucination) is the broad conception, and that no narrow conception of 
perceptual phenomenology can be correct.
Why is the relationalist going to balk at the narrow conception? By O. Beck’s 
own admission (Beck 2019b, 4–5), the same appearance property (W) and its neural 
realizer can occur even if the perceived object is not around. As soon as we grant 
that what it is like for the subject to perceive an object is solely determined by that 
subject’s appearance property and the neuro-computational state realizing that prop-
erty, the role of the perceived object in explaining perceptual phenomenal character 
will be screened-off (i.e. rendered explanatorily irrelevant) by the explanatory role 
of that appearance property and its neural basis (Martin 2004; 2006).
According to Logue (2013, 127–28), just because a perceptual experience super-
venes on a neural activity that can occur in the absence of the perceived object, it 
does not follow that the explanatory role of the perceived object is screened-off by 
that neural activity, since in cases of genuine perception that activity occurs in virtue 
of the fact that the object is perceived.
17 In other words, the way the object appears to the subject (or, in Beck’s terminology, the way the sub-
ject is appeared to when they perceive the object) is the way the object really is. The properties that 
constitute the phenomenal character of genuine perception (as opposed to hallucination) are literally the 
properties that the perceived object has independently of being perceived. What it is like for the subject 
to see an object is literally what the object is like. The phrase ‘for the subject’ does not mean that the 
properties in question are represented to the subject, or somehow modified by the perceptual system. It 
only means that the way the object is like for the subject depends on which properties of the object are 
seen by the subject on that occasion.
 Axiomathes
1 3
But this is beside the point. For the screening-off problem to arise, we do not have 
to assume that the subject is in exactly the same mental state when the experienced 
object is perceived and when it is merely hallucinated. The screening-off problem 
thrives on a more specific assumption that the subject is appeared to in the same way 
in both cases. If the way the genuinely perceiving subject is appeared to is consistent 
with the absence of the perceived object, and the only way to access the perceived 
object is via the way the subject is appeared to, then, for any perceptual episode, the 
claim that the way the subject is appeared to is an element in a relation involving the 
perceived object is in need of an a priori justification (cf. Travis 2017). Contrary to 
what Logue (2013, 130) suggests, relationalism was never intended to provide that 
justification. The relationalist claims that no such justification is necessary because 
the way one is appeared to when undergoing a genuine perception is such that ‘no 
experience like this, no experience of fundamentally the same kind, could have 
occurred had no appropriate candidate for awareness existed’ (Martin 2004, 39)18.
While O. Beck’s view fails to secure the objectivity of perceptual phenomenal 
character, the main virtue of selectionism and diaphaneity is precisely that they 
maintain the objectivity of perceptual phenomenal character. Insofar as my replies to 
objections against selectionism and diaphaneity are on the right track, none of those 
objections compels the relationalist to retreat to O. Beck’s view, nor any other view 
of that sort (see e.g. Logue 2012).
10  Conclusion
Diaphaneity of perceptual experience is not undermined by phenomenological 
considerations about the boundaries of visual experience and blurry vision. Nor 
is diaphaneity incompatible with empirical evidence concerning attentional varia-
tion, the correlation between perceptual phenomenal character and various physical 
properties, and unconscious perception. Each of these phenomena admits of being 
explained in selectionist terms, and there are good reasons to prefer these explana-
tions over those advocated by the critics. Of course, none of this shows that selec-
tionism and diaphaneity are true. What it does show, however, is that both claims 
are much more resilient to criticism than they are usually taken to be, and that recent 
declarations of their falsity are premature.
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